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When studying consumption choices, econo-
mists have often relied on the abstraction of a 
representative agent. Such an agent can indeed 
be shown to exist and to replicate the aggre-
gate consumers’ demand, but only under very 
strong (and actually quite unrealistic) assump-
tions (Alan P. Kirman 1992). There was also a 
justifiable reluctance to introduce heterogeneous 
preferences, as such a step might seem ad hoc 
when trying to explain different consumption 
behaviors. The rise of empirical studies based 
on microdata has opened new perspectives. 
The microeconomic importance of uninsurable 
risks is now recognized, and threatens the foun-
dations of the representative agent hypothesis 
often used in macroeconomics. The continu-
ing controversies surrounding the question of 
individual attitudes toward risk have motivated 
many empirical studies and observations; most 
of them find a bewildering diversity of individ-
ual preferences (Robert B. Barsky et al. 1997; 
Alma Cohen and Liran Einav 2002; Luigi Guiso 
and Monica Paiella 2008; Syngjoo Choi et al. 
2007; Chiappori and Paiella 2007). Clearly, the 
identifiability of the heterogeneous distribution 
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of preferences becomes a crucial issue in this 
perspective.
This paper proposes conditions under which 
heterogeneous individual attitudes toward risk 
can be nonparametrically identified from indi-
vidual- or market-level data on the choices made 
by agents over risk prospects. Our main result 
establishes that given data that is usually avail-
able (essentially market shares of the different 
risky prospects present within a market, plus 
the realizations of the final outcomes of agents), 
the analyst can recover the whole distribution 
of individual preferences so long as preferences 
can be indexed by a one-dimensional parameter 
that satisfies a fairly weak single-crossing con-
dition. We then discuss several applications of 
our general methodology.
I. Theory
We consider an economic situation in which 
a population of privately informed agents faces 
a finite menu of risky prospects. In this sec-
tion, we assume that from the perspective of 
the econometrician, this population appears 
homogeneous. Equivalently, the econometri-
cian has data on a bigger population, includ-
ing some variables X describing the population 
under study, and the subgroup we consider here 
appears homogeneous because we implicitly 
control for the values of X.
A. The Economic Model
Agents are heterogeneous; each agent is char-
acterized by some parameter θ, his type, which 
is his private information. Within a market, 
all agents are proposed the same finite menu  = {c1, … , cn }. Each prospect ci in this set can 
be thought of as a lottery (or a “bet”), which in 
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practice may be an insurance contract, a job pro-
posal, or any choice involving risky outcomes. 
There is a set of consequences  ⊂ 핉k, a typi-
cal element of which is a real vector m; lotter-
ies on this set are characterized by their c.d.f. 
F. In the most typical case, the consequence m 
is simply a scalar m ∈ ℝ measured in monetary 
units. By assumption, agents care only about 
consequences, so that we endow each agent 
with preferences represented by the utility func-
tional W(F, θ). This functional may be expected 
utility:
 W(F, θ) =  ∫ 
 
 
 
 u (m, θ) dF(m),
but we do not require this assumption; in fact, 
we will put much stress on identifying possible 
departures from expected utility in the popula-
tion of agents.
When faced with the menu  of prospects, 
agent θ associates a distribution F( ∙ | ci , θ) to 
each feasible choice ci, i = 1, … , n; note, in par-
ticular, that the (perceived) probability distri-
bution induced by a given action may depend 
on the agent’s type, as would be the case, for 
instance, when riskiness is agent-specific. Given 
the agent’s preferences W, she will choose the 
option that gives the highest value to V(ci, θ) = W(F( ∙ | ci , θ), θ), which yields a choice func-
tion C(θ, ). 
This model of choice is very general, indeed 
so much so that we cannot make much progress 
without specializing it. In this paper we discuss 
the one-dimensional case with single-crossing. 
So we take θ to be a scalar, whose distribution 
we normalize to be uniform over [0, 1]1; and we 
assume the existence of a complete ordering ≺ 
of prospects such that:
Single Crossing Assumption (SC): For any θ < θ′ and any pair of prospects c ≺ c′,
 V(c, θ) ≤ V(c′, θ)
implies
 V(c, θ′) < V(c′, θ′).
1 If θ is distributed according to some c.d.f. Φ, 
then  
_ θ= Φ(θ) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and we can 
define  
__ V (c,  _ θ) = V(c,  __ Φ−1 ( _ θ)).
The SC Assumption is standard. It states, 
in our context, that one can rank the prospects 
of the menu  in such a way that agents with a 
higher type prefer prospects with a higher rank. 
One may, for instance, identify θ to a risk prefer-
ence parameter, and rank prospects by increas-
ing risk. Then our assumption requires, first, that 
the diversity of preferences be accounted for by 
a single parameter, and, second, that they can be 
ranked globally by decreasing dislike for risk. 
But our setting can accommodate other inter-
pretations. For instance, in a nonexpected util-
ity framework, θ could index some deformation 
of probability; alternatively, we may think of a 
model entailing robust control à la Lars Hansen 
and Thomas Sargent (2007), and θ could then 
indicate the cost the agent put on probability 
distortions.2
Without loss of generally, we may assume that 
the ranking characterized in the SC Assumption 
is the natural one—i.e., ci ≺ cj if and only if 
i < j. Note also that the single-crossing condi-
tion bears on a complex object, as the type θ 
might enter both preferences and distributions 
of consequences. That is, θ enters both W(F, θ) 
and F( ∙ | ci , θ). We will discuss subcases below.
B. The Data
Ideally, we would like to recover the distribu-
tion of preferences W(F, θ) over the set of types. 
Obviously this requires us to assume at a mini-
mum that we have stable preferences, i.e., we 
observe the same population distribution mak-
ing choices over different menus of contracts. 
We can think of each such menu  as defining 
a market, and the basic idea we pursue below 
is how cross market variations in the choice set 
facing agents identifies W(F, θ) nonparametri-
cally. For each market  in the support of the 
data generating process, the econometrician 
observes: 
•	 The	 market	 share	 si() of each prospect, 
which is given by
 si() = Pr [C(θ, ) = i ];
2 We could also forgo preference heterogeneity and focus 
on heterogeneity of risk, for instance in a model of insur-
ance under adverse selection.
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•	 The	 empirical	 distribution	 of	 m, for each 
prospect:
 Gi(m | ) = E[F(m | ci, θ) | i = C(θ, )].
The assumption on the observability of mar-
ket shares does not call for much discussion. 
On the other hand, a couple of remarks are in 
order here. First, the same population must be 
observed in different choice situations; this 
clearly requires that there exist an unmodelled 
but exogenous shock on the supply side that var-
ies the menu of contracts across markets. Think, 
for example, of the population of bettors in a 
horse race on Sundays, or of young male driv-
ers in rural regions shopping for car insurance. 
In both cases it may be reasonable to assume 
that the distribution of preferences remains the 
same on each Sunday, or across regions. In the 
first case menus differ because different horses 
in different races have different winning prob-
abilities. In the second case menus may vary 
from one region to another because loading 
factors differ, reflecting, for instance, various 
levels of competition across insurers by regions. 
Note that the econometrician does not need to 
model the precise reason these menus differ—as 
long as she can make the case that the underly-
ing process is independent of preferences or the 
riskiness of agents at the same time.
Second, the equation on empirical distribu-
tions above requires that agents have correct 
beliefs when making their choices. For instance, 
if we analyze insurance contracts, we are requir-
ing that an agent make decisions based on the 
true distribution of claims conditional on (ci, θ). 
Such an assumption cannot be avoided: barring 
data on beliefs, most datasets could be rational-
ized by assigning strange beliefs to agents.
C. Identification
The beauty of single crossing, as shown in 
hundreds of papers since James A. Mirrlees (1971), is that it yields market segmentation: 
given a menu , agents with a higher θ will 
choose prospects with a higher rank. Then we 
can define a sequence of numbers θi() for 
i = 1, … , n − 1 such that:
• θ0() = 0;
• θn() = 1;
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•	 Prospect	i ∈ {1, … , n} is chosen by the set of 
types
 θ ∈ [θi−1(), θi()].
In particular, the type θi() is defined by the 
property that such agents are just indifferent 
between choices ci and ci+1. By single crossing, 
all agents with a type above θi() strictly pre-
fer ci+1 over ci , while types below θi() have the 
opposite preference.
Since we normalized the distribution of types 
to be uniform in [0, 1], the market share of pros-
pect i among agents is
 si() = θi() − θi−1(),
which can be rewritten as
 θi() =  ∑ 
j≤i
 
  s i().
We may thus assume that for each menu , 
the econometrician knows the indices of types 
indifferent between two consecutive prospects.
Similarly, we can rewrite the estimated distri-
bution of consequences as
 Gi(m | ) =  1 ____ si()      ∫ 
   θi−1()
 
θi()
  F(m | ci, θ) dθ.
We may now provide a first intuition of the 
identification strategy. Consider the subset of 
markets whose menu includes the prospect ci. 
for each such market. We know the values of 
the bounds in the integral and the function to 
be integrated are the same. If there is “enough 
variation” in these bounds, in the sense that the 
support of the distribution of (θi−1(), θi()) is 
“sufficiently large” (for example, [0, 1] × [0, 1] 
would be sufficient but certainly not necessary), 
we can recover from the data the value of the 
function F(m | ci, θ), for any m and any θ such 
that there exists a market in which θ indeed 
chooses ci .
Finally, we know that for any menu  and for 
any i we have
  W[F(∙ | ci, θi()), θi()]
 = W[F(∙ | ci+1, θi()), θi()].
AQ 3
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Now fix a value for both the agent’s type and 
the prospect—say,  
_ θ and  _ c . Consider the subset 
of markets for which  
_ θ is indifferent between _ c and an adjacent prospect—technically, the set 
of menus  such that ci =  _ c and either θi() or θi−1() equals  _ θ . Intuitively, each such market 
provides a point on the indifference curve of θ 
that goes through F(∙ | c, θ). Provided such obser-
vations display enough variation, one can iden-
tify the indifference curves of agent θ, and thus 
her preferences up to an increasing transform.
Our present goal is to introduce a general 
methodology. Consequently, we shall not attempt 
a general statement of the necessary conditions 
for identification; it is much easier to illustrate 
them on specific examples. Suffices to say that, 
in many cases, the corresponding assumptions 
are fairly simple. Moreover, the Single-Crossing 
Assumption, as well as other features of our 
model, can be tested.
II. Applications
We now turn to a few selected examples.
A. Parimutuel horse Betting
Let us start with parimutuel betting on horse 
races, which we study in much more detail in a 
companion paper (Chiappori et al. 2008). With 
betting, we typically do not have bettor-level 
data; on the other hand, we can observe odds 
of each horse in a very large number of races, 
along with the results of the race. The former 
gives us information on the preferences of bet-
tors, as odds result from a simple market mecha-
nism; the latter informs us on the distribution of 
consequences of bets. To make this clear, con-
sider the market for “win bets” in a race with n 
horses. Each bettor chooses on which horse he 
wants to bet a fixed amount. The odds Ri is the 
net return from a winning bet: if a bettor bets $1 
on horse i, his final wealth is increased by Ri if i 
wins, and reduced by $1 if i loses.
Bets on races may be organized by bookmak-
ers, as in Bruno Jullien and Salanié (2000); but 
parimutuel data are more useful for our pur-
poses, as odds then mechanically reflect the 
market shares of horses. In parimutuel races, 
the money bet is placed in a pool; the organizers 
of the race (and/or the taxman) receive a share t 
known as the “take,” and the lucky bettors share 
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what is left in the pool. Hence, market shares (si) 
and odds (Ri) are related by the simple equality
 Ri + 1 =  1 − t ____si   ,
and the value of t can be deduced from the fact 
that ∑i si = 1.
Observe also that if we properly control for 
observables, the winning probability of horse i 
in a race with odds (R1, … , Rn ) can be a func-
tion only of these odds, since bettors care only 
about consequences3. Hence, this probability 
pi(R1, … , Rn) can be computed as the empirical 
frequency of the event “horse i wins,” on the 
subset of races with such odds (assuming a large 
enough dataset).
We can now apply our theoretical work to 
horse races. The first step is to partition the set 
of races into different subsets; within each sub-
set (e.g., races held on weekdays on a particular 
track), we assume that the population of bettors 
is the same in each race.4
We then have to specify what information 
agents have regarding each race; this is not 
an easy task, as information on horses is typi-
cally dispersed across betters, and odds are not 
known until the beginning of the race since they 
result from the amounts bet. We rely on a result 
by Amit K. Gandhi (2008), which shows that if 
the pooled information of the agents pins down 
the actual probabilities, then there is a unique 
and fully revealing rational expectations equi-
librium of the underlying contingent claims 
market. Assuming that this equilibrium pre-
vails, we obtain that beliefs will be correct in 
equilibrium, as if all betters knew the probabili-
ties pi(R1, … , Rn) and the odds (R1, … , Rn). Using 
the notation from the previous section, we see 
that the menu offered to bettors is simply  = {(p1, R1), … , (pn, Rn)} (each horse ci being char-
acterized by a probability of winning and a pay-
ment in case of success). The distribution of the 
final monetary outcome, F(m | c, θ), is simply a 
binomial distribution, in general  independent of 
3 This does not need to be true if odds are set by oligopo-
listic bookmakers, since they may set odds that depend on 
other considerations, such as the existence of other races. 
Under parimutuel betting, such a problem does not arise.
4 We leave self-selection of bettors for further work.
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θ 5: given i and , m = Ri with probability pi , and 
m = −1 with probability (1 − pi).
As agents care only for consequences, we can 
thus write
 V(ci, θ) = V(Ri, pi, θ).
Chiappori et al. (2008) then use a simple con-
dition on V to ensure that single crossing holds: 
agents with higher types θ must dislike risk less (in a precise sense that fits this general utility 
theoretic framework). As a consequence, one can 
identify the whole distribution of preferences.
This application has several features that 
greatly simplify matters. First, the particular 
rules of parimutuel betting limit the need for 
data; odds allow one to directly recover market 
shares and the take. Second, barring probability 
deformation, the distribution of consequences of 
a bet on a horse does not depend on the type θ 
of the bettor, but only on the odds of the horse 
Ri and on the probability pi that the horse wins. 
As a consequence, it is very easy to identify the 
probability distribution on consequences from 
the data. Note, however, that more complex 
models can also be estimated in this framework; 
for instance, the decision criteria may entail 
nonexpected utility criteria that are not linear 
in probability, in which case the perceived dis-
tribution may depend on θ. Again, the reader is 
referred to Chiappori et al. (2008) for precise 
results and proofs.
B. Compensating Wage Differences
A very similar framework can be applied to 
the analysis of the statistical value of human life. 
Book I of the Wealth of Nations already empha-
sized that [...] the wages of labour vary with the 
ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, 
the honourableness or dishonourableness, of the 
employment.”
A fortiori, Sherwin Rosen (1988) emphasized 
that the wage differential needed to compensate 
a higher probability of accidental death allows to 
estimate the value of life. It has been extensively 
used subsequently (see, for instance, Joseph E. 
Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi 2003). In all studies, 
however, homogeneity is a crucial  prerequisite; 
5 Note, however, that the initial wealth of an agent can 
be part of his type θ.
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i.e., identification relies on the rather doubtful 
assumption that all workers have the same mon-
etary valuation of their life.
Our approach suggests that this assumption 
is simply not needed. Specifically, assume that 
agents are faced with a menu of jobs, each of 
which is defined by a wage and some parameters 
related to its riskiness; to keep things simple, let 
us assume that the risk is a fixed probability of 
a lethal accident, and that the latter can be esti-
mated from data on the distribution of accidents 
in each job i. Also, let θ index the value that any 
given agent assigns to his life; that is, the value 
of agent θ’s life is some v(θ) with v(0) corre-
sponding to a minimum level (say zero) and v(1) 
to some upper bound. Here, a job ci = (wi, pi) 
is fully defined by a wage wi and a death prob-
ability pi. The resulting probability distribution 
F(m | c, θ) is again a binomial distribution. An 
agent choosing the job i in the available menu  receives m = wi with probability 1 − pi , and 
m = −θ with probability (1 − pi). The wage 
rate wi of a job is typically observable, and the 
probability of death parameter pi can readily be 
identified from available data on average casu-
alty rate per job; also, the natural ranking is by 
increasing risk (and wage).
Considering now the estimation of prefer-
ences, we may start with the simplest case of 
risk-neutral agents (which most of the existing 
literature focuses on); then θi() is defined by
 (1 − pi)wi + piv(θi()) = (1 − pi+1)wi+1 
 + pi+1 v(θi());
therefore
 v(θi()) =   (1 − pi)wi − (1 − pi+1 )wi+1   ____________________pi+1 − pi 
and the function v is exactly identified. Note that 
the single-crossing condition is obviously satis-
fied in that case.
We may, however, go one step further, by 
assuming first that individuals are characterized 
by some common utility u that is concave in 
monetary rewards. The equation becomes
 (1 − pi)u(wi) + piv(θi()) = (1 − pi+1)u(wi+1)
   + pi+1 v(θi()).
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Now, assume we can observe different menus 
in which the same agent  
_ θ is pivotal between the 
same job (  __ p ,  __ w ) and different alternatives ( p, w). 
Then, it must be the case that for all these alter-
natives, the expected utility (1 − p)u(w) + pv( _ θ) 
is constant (this is the “indifference curve” men-
tioned above). In practice, if these various alter-
natives describe a wage/probability relationship 
of the form p(w,  _ θ), then
 v( _ θ) =    (1 −  
__ p )u( __ w ) − (1 − p(w,  _ θ))u(w) ________________________
p(w,   θ) −  __ p  
and if we normalize u( __ w ) to be zero, we have 
that
  
u(w) ____
v(  θ)  =   
 
__ p − p(w,  _ θ)  _________
1 − p(w,   θ) 
which identifies both u and v up to a common 
multiplicative constant and also generates strong 
overidentifying restrictions.
Finally, we may also introduce heterogeneous 
utilities by allowing u to depend on θ, although 
the single-crossing condition will then have to 
be tested ex post.
The intuition of this example is clear. While the 
existing literature tends to pick up arbitrarily one 
type of risky job and estimate the statistical value of 
life from this unique source under the assumption 
of identical consumers, we suggest that additional 
mileage could be obtained form the respective 
“market shares” of various dangerous professions.
C. Insurance and Portfolio Choice
As a third possible application, consider the 
choice of an insurance contract—a topic already 
studied by Chiappori et al. (2005) and Cohen 
and Einav (2002), among others. Here, a con-
tract is, in the simplest case, defined by a pair 
consisting of a premium and a fixed deductible. 
The distribution induced by a particular choice 
may be more complex than before, since it need 
not be binomial: losses incurred by the agent can 
in principle take any value below the deduct-
ible–although several applied papers actually 
disregard this issue, certainly an acceptable 
simplification when the deductible is low. In any 
case, it can, as before, be identified from avail-
able data on accident realizations (and possibly 
conditional losses); this has actually been done 
in several papers.
The next step is to study individual demand 
for specific contracts. This task, again, has been 
performed in a few existing papers, although our 
approach introduces an important innovation. 
Specifically, existing work heavily relies on para-
metric assumptions on preferences (e.g., CARA 
expected utility). However, it follows from the 
previous discussions that the shape of individual 
preferences as a function of the heterogeneity 
parameter θ can be nonparametrically identified 
by a procedure close to (although more general 
than) the one just described. Again, the crucial 
requirement is that similar agents must be faced 
with different menus of contracts, which implies 
a source of contract variation that is orthogonal 
to individual preferences. Fortunately, the exis-
tence of such variations seems well established 
empirically.
In the literature, two types of heterogeneity 
have been considered so far. One is heteroge-
neity in risks. In such frameworks, agents have 
identical preferences but different accident 
probabilities, and the choice of an insurance 
contract partly reflects information about idio-
syncratic risk. The vast empirical literature on 
asymmetric information in insurance, starting 
with Chiappori and Salanié (2000), belongs 
to this class. Unlike the previous examples, 
in these models the distribution of probabil-
ity over outcomes, F(∙ | ci, θ), does depend on θ (which is correlated with risk) as well as ci (say, because of ex ante or ex post moral haz-
ard). Estimating this relationship is often the 
difficult part of the empirical analysis; clearly, 
the availability of different menus is crucial 
here. On the other hand, once the function F 
has been recovered, estimating the (common) 
utility from contract choices is usually sim-
pler. Alternatively, one can consider a model in 
which agents have homogeneous risks (at least 
conditional on the information available to the 
insurer),6 but differ in their preferences. Then 
F does not depend on θ (which is now inter-
preted, for instance, as a risk aversion param-
eter), and can readily be recovered from data 
on claims.7 Heterogeneity is mainly reflected in 
6 Regarding automobile insurance, for instance, many 
insurers tend to believe that, if anything, they have a much 
better knowledge of a client’s risk than the client himself.
7 However, the decision to file a claim may be endog-
enous, and possibly correlated with risk aversion; see 
Chiappori et al. (2006) for a discussion.
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contract choices; the single  crossing condition 
typically expresses that more risk-averse agents 
always prefer more comprehensive coverage, a 
property most models will satisfy. Again, one 
can then try to estimate nonparametrically the (heterogeneous) shape of individual preferences 
from available data.
An obvious limitation of our approach, in 
the case of insurance contracts, is the one-
dimensionality of the heterogeneity param-
eter θ. Strictly speaking, it requires either that 
individuals differ only in their risk or their risk 
aversion (but not both); or, if both dimensions 
are allowed to vary in the population, that there 
exist a perfect correlation between them, so that 
the resulting heterogeneity can be represented 
by one index only. While this setting is very 
restrictive, it is still possible to find interesting 
theoretical frameworks that are compatible with 
it. For instance, in Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (2007), agents can exert an effort to reduce their 
accident probability, and heterogeneous atti-
tudes to risk result in different effort levels, and 
therefore different realized risks. In that context, 
a (one-dimensional) distribution of risk aversion 
generates heterogeneity in both risk and contract 
choices conditional on risk.
Finally, the same logic can be extended 
beyond the strict confines of insurance. For 
instance, most work on portfolio choice uses 
continuous models, in which the proportions 
of the various asset classes can be freely var-
ied. In many cases, however, the choice faced 
by individuals is much simpler. When elect-
ing a pension plan, for instance, many house-
holds are offered a small number of preexisting 
plans, and the choice is essentially discrete (even though continuous parameters can some-
times be varied in a given plan). Plans may dif-
fer in many respects, e.g., riskiness, liquidity, 
and geographical coverage. To the extent that 
the heterogeneity between agents’ preferences 
regarding these plans can be assumed to be one-
dimensional (and satisfy the single-crossing 
condition), our approach can be useful. Here, 
the “consequences” can be any performance 
measure (expected return, volatility, beta) that 
can be estimated from the data; and the shape 
of (heterogeneous) preferences can be esti-
mated, provided again that similar agents are 
faced with different menus of pension plans for 
exogenous reasons, say, the employer’s policy 
toward employees’ retirement.
III. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general methodol-
ogy for estimating heterogeneous preferences in 
situations of discrete choice under risk. Our key 
requirements are (i) that the existing heteroge-
neity can be summarized in a one-dimensional 
parameter, and (ii) that there exists some exog-
enous source of variation in the menus faced 
by the agents. Neither of these assumptions is 
innocuous. It should, however, be stressed that 
they typically allow a nonparametric identifica-
tion of the distribution of preferences (or risks); 
moreover, they are empirically testable, and 
actually generate strong overidentifying restric-
tions. Empirical work currently in progress 
should give us a better understanding of their 
relevance.
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